We have design a private-information game to incorporate independent experts' assistance. With the better information provided by experts, the mistrust of the uninformed party might be dissolved. And we may get an effective and efficient resolution outcome. We will investigate conditions under which the experts' information may help the economy to get an efficient outcome or an effective resolution result.
Introduction
For the last few decades, environmental regulations have always been one of the major issues of government policies and world collaborations. Countless conferences were held to solve the global warming (or climate change) problem since the adoption of Kyoto Protocol in 1997. This protocol has the enforcing power to commit the signing countries to reduce GHG (greenhouse gas) emission. However, this protocol was not enforced until February 16, 2005, and unfortunately, the protocol will expire at the end of 2012. A new framework of GHG reduction plan needs to be negotiated before 2012, but after the failed attempt in 2009 Copenhagen Summit, the gap between Kyoto protocol and new commitment will be inevitable. It is usually difficult and time-consuming to reach an agreement in almost every international conference. There are conflicts between economic interests and concerns about the environment, global or otherwise. There are also political struggles between different interest groups in each country.
Climate change has the devastating effect on many aspects of our economic and political life. In addition to rising sea level, glacier retreat and disappearance, life-threatening storm and heat waves, extreme weather would also cause damages not only to agricultural sector but also other industries that depend on the stable supply of natural resources, such as water for processing and cleaning. Apart from the climate change issue, many countries also face different civil disputes concerning resource redistribution and local environmental issues, such as who is entitled to what rights, or who should get more.
Environmental disputes may even cause political instability, depending on the scope and scale of the disputes, and subsequently, causing economic problems. Dispute is inevitably inefficient because of the wasted time, energy and resources, if unresolved, the loss will be large. Many disputes are unresolved simply because of distrust caused by private information. Even with agreement, distrust may lengthen the process, causing inefficiency.
To eliminate this type of inefficiency, Moore and Repullo [1] implement subgame perfect outcomes, Abreu and Sen [2] modified and extend M-R model to more applications for subgame perfect implementation. Subgame perfect implementation loses its power if information is incomplete. When disputes caused by private information, such case is usually fallen under the incomplete information framework. Within incomplete information framework, Baliga [3] and Bergin and Sen [4] provide sufficient and necessary conditions for sequential equilibrium implementation. However, their model is rather restrictive in its applications and failed to address the specific information restriction (e.g. highly asymmetric and not easy to verify) which applies to the cases of environmental disputes and conflict resolutions.
We modified the analytical framework and conditions, extending it to the issues of conflict resolution using independent experts as the verification mechanism and to deter people from cheating. In reality, civil court cases resolved many such disputes, and distrust was the main reason for them to file the suit in the first place. In court, they would use expert witness to verify the information and evidences, and the case would settle in court or out of court. Since environmental disputes involve complicated technical details, the resolution outcome requires experts' verification. We devise a mechanism closely resembled court practice and use third party expert as a credible threat to force "would-be deceiver" reveal the true information, and to resolve the dispute "out-of-court" without losing efficiency. This mechanism may apply to international dispute cases, including negotiating GHG reduction commitment.
The Notation and Definitions
Suppose, in the dispute, only one involved party has private information (for example, he can afford to abate more pollution) that he tries to conceal in order to gain a more favorable outcome. We denote this private information as the type of nature,  . Let denote the finite feasible type profile,
Definition: An assessment is consistent if there is a sequence of assessment that converges to 
, , but she cannot differentiate the component within the same partition. The prior distribution of partition  is
is at least as fine as , which means for every
The economic decisions are made based on the information partition structure available at the time of decision. Since player i cannot distinguish the states within each partition, i.e., l P i   P l , the decisions are the same within each .
Definition: Information structure is nonexclusive (NEI) if
Under NEI structure, no player has exclusive private information. NEI is a special case of partitional information. Complete information is a special case of NEI structure, where number of element in each partition is 1.
Information can be renewed when new evidence is introduced by expert's report. A credence probability is a subjective belief that the player put on the expert's report. If player believes the expert's report is sincere, then she will make the decision based on the report. A proper reward structure can influence the sincerity of the expert's report. The expert may care too much about his reputation to be insincere even with little reward. Suppose the reward for the expert's report is , where m is the report,
e denotes the effort level, and . With } 1 , 0 {  e  , the expert can make a sincere (accurate) report with the cost of c. A risk-neutral expert would choose an effort level to maximize his/her expected payoff.
Definition S1: A report is called "sincere" if 1 e  . Definition S2: A reward structure is sincerity-inducing
 Suppose player i put a credence probability, i  , on the expert's report. The expected payoff of player i is Considering the refinement of Grossman and Perry [5] , we can assign positive probabilities to test the credibility of off-the-equilibrium-path (OTEP) strategies. When the uninformed parties get a new FPI with a new prior belief, the old information partition and prior belief system will be discarded, otherwise a credible OTEP deviation might be found with a support of a positive probability on some profiles which do not exist in the new information set. The definition for the new updating rule can be con- 
.
and  is at least as fine as    , then probability distribution for the partition, i.e.  , changes to a new prior , which has the support contained in the support of .
If an unexpected move a  (OTEP move) occurs, and there exists a set 
  for all subsequent history of h. Our new SE is defined henceforth with this definition of NUR. Under NUR, the SE is stronger, because when player updates her belief, she not only deals with zeroprobability events, but also a new information partition.
Necessary and Sufficient Conditions
Necessary and sufficient conditions are required, before a working mechanism can be constructed to implement the truth-revealing SE outcome:
Necessary Condition
For the truth-revealing purpose, our necessary condition is a revised version of condition C in [1] , condition  in [2] , and condition B in [3] . We will need some definitions before constructing our necessary condition.
Definition (N1): An allocation x is a function, such that :
x X   , where X is a finite set of possible allocations.
Definition ( 
, and also
3) a sequence of probability measures:
where denotes some belief system which support this deviation.
 
We can derive proposition 1 by using condition A. Proposition 1. If a truth-revealing choice function f is implemented as the SE outcome then it satisfies condition A.
Proof: Assume that f is implemented as a SE by an extensive mechanism g. Let   to be a SE. Suppose some agents play deception α which implement f x   , for this deception to be non-optimal, it must be profitable for some types of agents, say j(L), to defect from deception, thus, the deception is upset. This is shown as a "preference reversal" condition in the (A2) part of condition A. That is, a deviation from deception would generate an expected payoff,   
, then f cannot be an outcome in  , SE g   , which contradict the initial assumption that f is implemented in
The necessary condition eliminates the deception α played by the informed player. For the deception to be non-optimal, it must be worthwhile for some types of agent to defect from the deception. Condition A allows a sequence of strategies for some agents to play deception until stage L, then he will find himself to face a preference reversal in the next stage. Condition A is only a necessary condition because it does not consider the effect on the posterior belief and the associated strategies when deception is played in the previous stage. If deception is played and there are consistent beliefs supporting this deception, the deception outcome may not be ruled out.
Sufficient Condition
To achieve a truth-revealing dispute resolution, we need a sufficient condition that would allow us to design a mechanism using expert's report as a credible threat to implement truth-revealing SE outcome. We use the weak domain restriction and a restriction on the posterior beliefs on deception to rule out the possibility of deception.
The following definition and condition are the necessary parts for our sufficient condition.
Definition DR: A choice function f satisfies the domain restriction if not all agents have the same ranking over all outcomes.
Condition B follows the same reasoning of the "posterior reversal" condition in [4] .
Condition B: Let f be the choice set of the truth-revealing outcomes, which satisfies the domain restriction. For each deception D   , there exist an associated outcome set, f  , and the supporting posterior belief,
  is the truth-telling strategy set for all other players except player i.
Suppose there exist two constant allocations, i.e., , y z X  , and suppose that (B1-1) there exists a consistent belief, i.e., '  , which support truthful reporting with new information partition . Let Under this condition, the posterior reversal condition identifies the properties of posterior distribution which separate the beliefs of truth-telling from deception. The posterior distribution translates the variations in beliefs into variation in the distribution over outcomes. At some point, the belief under truth-telling (i.e.,  ) is separated from the beliefs under deception (i.e.,   ). Condition (B1) shows that if player i challenges and push the game into 2nd stage, then y will be the equilibrium under truth-telling, and it will be z if player j plays deception. Condition (B2) shows that the challenger will change her counter offer to * x after the elicitation of the private information under condition (B1).
Condition B can be simplified when we introduce a new player, i.e. the expert. Although the expert has the perfect information about the type profile, but this information structure is although similar to but not really a true NEI structure, because uninformed players will be informed only after a sincere report or a voluntary reve-lation by informed player. However, with a proper re
Mechanism: An Example
We can construct many types of mechanism to resolve environmental conflict and disputes. Suppose game G consists of the following stages:
Stage j.0 To elicit player j's private information.
Player i would form her prior belief   ,   . Stage j. i: Player j announces his type, j  , and player i simultaneously announces either "agree" or "challenge". If player i announces "agree", j f ( )  is chosen and implemented, game ends here and no more information will be extracted; therefore, no more sunk costs to spend. If player i issues a "challenge", she suspects player j's announcement. Player i has two options after issuing the "challenge":
(1) By announcing a credence probability η as the mixed strategy measure, she chooses to randomize between eliciting and believing in the expert's report to make her final offer (i.e., proceed to stage j.p) or breaking up the negotiation (i.e., game ends here).
(2) Player j is allowed to make another announcement, i.e., j j    . Player i can either "agree" and implement the resolution outcome according to  and  (the new supporting beliefs), or "challenge" again. If she agrees, game ends here. If she challenges, player j will pay more shares toward hiring the expert, then proceed to stage j. p.
Stage j. p: Expert is hired to reveal the true state, and to choose a pair of worse outcomes  ,  y z , which are chosen according to condition (D2). Player i and player j share the cost of hiring the expert. At this stage, player j can be punished according to the deception made in stage j. i, an player i can also pay some penalty for issuing unnecessary challenges. Game ends here.
This mechanism can be applied to resolve environmental disputes as well as other kind of conflict, as long as the dispute is caused by deception alone and the only way to gain resolution is to reveal the truth. There are also some case studies on similar types of conflict resolution and mechanism suggestions in Lin [6] . We will discuss some environmental dispute cases which could be resolved by our mechanism.
The Applicable Example Explained
One example of possible application would be the disputes between Formosa Plastic (FP) and Texas' local environmental watchdog, i.e. Calhoun County Resource Watch (CCRW) since late 1980s. Texas needed FP to boost their plummeting economy in the 1980s, but the waste water discharged from FP would cause a huge degradation in quality and quantities to the shrimps in Lavaca Bay (the 3rd largest fishing ground in the United States at that time). CCRW's president took some extreme measures to stop FP's operations, for example, she undertook the hunger strike for more than 40 days and sunk her boat on the spot at the time of FP's effluent discharge. After the news exposure, FP had to pay huge fine for the violations. CCRW suspected FP of covering up spills, silencing workers, flouting the EPA and dumping highly toxic chemicals into the air, land and sea. FP claimed they are willing to put forward a plan of further abatement. But CCRW did not trust the company enough to negotiate. So the war between them went on for years, before they had to sit down and talk in order to solve the problem. Our mechanism would make the information revealed to all parties involved, and the resolution would start from there. This actually happened in 1993 when an outside expert trusted by CCRW joined the negotiation process and an agreement was signed after that. However, there's no real law or legal mechanism for the disputing parties to conduct such resolution process, so the agreement in 1993 is really accidental. Thus, when another dispute started again in 2002, the local activist had to chain herself to one of the plant's towers.
Our mechanism could be applied in the following fashion: a law is enacted to required all disputing parties to form a resolution committee (acts like the arbitrator), and the law gives this committee the legal right to put forward a set of "rewards" and "penalties" according to our sufficient and necessary conditions, and the resolution process starts from there. When the true information is undoubtedly revealed, an agreement will be signed, just like the 1993 agreement between CCRW and FP, and the dispute is resolved.
Global disputes like climate change and GHG reduction issues is too complex for a single mechanism to resolve the problem, but as long as the true information is revealed to all parties concerned, no one could morally condemn the country that cannot truly afford the costs of abatement. When there is no deception and no private agenda across the negotiation table, they might find a possible solution to reduce GHG and in the mean time to preserve the economy of that country as well. The contribution of our theory is to eliminate the possible deception which may worsen the problem of the disputes and make everyone worse off in the end.
Conclusions
We have shown the basic model and the sufficient and necessary conditions for a proper mechanism to implement a perfect information (truth-revealing) SE outcome and to resolve the disputes caused by information asymmetry. We have also shown some possible applications.
Our model can be applied to a wide variety of interesting cases, such as externality and compensation mechanism, conflict resolution, negotiation, and bargaining problems, if the conflict is caused by deception alone. The independent third-party experts serve as an option to catch deception if necessary, even though we may never be called upon to use them in SE implementation, since the essence of our model is to get the information revealed in the first stage and the dispute is resolve then and there.
